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18.1  Introduction 
Like many other countries in East Asia, Thailand has a long history of ex- 
tended family relationships in which family members across generations pro- 
vide help to one another throughout their lifetimes. The state or government in 
this case plays a relatively minor role (vis-his families) in assisting individ- 
uals in their lives and livelihood. Until  1993 Thailand did not have  a well- 
defined social security system, and although some systems of public assistance 
were always in existence, the size and extent of this public assistance was not 
large. Therefore, whether the government would create an intergenerational 
fiscal burden on future generations as a result of present tax and transfer poli- 
cies has yet to become a hot issue. Things may change with the full operation 
of the social security system in 1998, when Thailand will add an old-age pen- 
sion to the existing four areas of  coverage, namely, sickness not related to 
work, maternity leave, invalidity, and death. 
The involvement of the state in the lives of  its citizens is manifest in the 
traditional instrument of  the  public  sector-fiscal  policy. The government 
taxes the people to transfer resources from private hands to public hands. By 
so doing the government effects change in both the level and the distribution 
of welfare of people in the posttax situation. The level and distribution of pub- 
lic welfare change again with the spending of  the public money raised from 
Nan&  Kakwani is professor of econometrics at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, 
Australia. Medhi Krongkaew is director of  the Institute of East Asian Studies and the APEC Study 
Centre, Thammasat University, Bangkok. He also teaches economics at the Faculty of Economics 
of  the  same university, specializing in  public economics, economic development, and the Thai 
economy. 
This paper draws heavily on a previous study by Nanak Kakwani, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Medhi 
Krongkaew, Sudhir Shetty, and Jan Walliser. See Kakwani et al. (1996). 
413 414  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
taxes and other revenue sources. The net effect of these tax-transfer policies, 
or the net fiscal incidence, can be linked with the concern about intergenera- 
tional fiscal burden to answer the question of whether the government through 
its fiscal policy helps or hurts future generations. 
This paper uses a recently developed technique called generational account- 
ing to assess the sustainability  of  Thailand's  fiscal policy. Generational  ac- 
counting determines whether the spending policies currently in place can be 
maintained without raising the net lifetime tax payments (tax paid net of trans- 
fers received) of  future generations. Several studies in OECD countries have 
suggested  the existence of  serious generational  imbalances  (see Auerbach, 
Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 1991; Franco et al. 1993; Auerbach et al. 1993; Gok- 
hale, Raffelhuschen, and Walliser 1995; Hagemann and John 1995). An appli- 
cation of generational accounting to Thailand is therefore of particular interest 
because it can shed light on the intergenerational stance of  fiscal policy in a 
developing country. It has been observed that many developing countries' eco- 
nomic and demographic structures contrast sharply with those of  developed 
countries. Specifically, populations tend to be very young, with the fraction 
below age 25 often exceeding 50 percent of the total population. Productivity 
growth rates are generally either much higher or much lower than in industrial- 
ized countries.'  In addition, the tax systems in developing countries are often 
characterized by limited personal income taxation and transfer payments. 
Countries with limited transfer payments are likely to have more favorable 
generational policies because transfer programs typically benefit the elderly at 
the expense of current young and future generations. However, the structure of 
the tax-transfer system in many developing countries is subject to change- 
change that may produce imbalances in generational policies. What can we say 
about the situation in Thailand? Have Thai fiscal policies a tendency to favor 
present or  future generations? Will the pay-as-you-go social security system 
that Thailand launched in 1993 create an unfair intergenerational burden on fu- 
ture Thai generations? What kind of fiscal planning is needed for a more bal- 
anced generational account? And so on. These are some of the questions we 
will be dealing with in this paper. 
In what follows, section 18.2 describes the demographic and fiscal structures 
of Thailand. It will emphasize the changes in tax and expenditure structures of 
the Thai government in the past two and half decades to see their prospective 
impacts the population as a whole. Section 18.3 discusses the construction of 
generational  accounts  and the data used.  Section  18.4 presents  the results, 
along with some policy  simulations.  Section  18.5 summarizes the findings 
and concludes. 
1. See Kotlikoff and Walliser (1995) for more detailed description of  how these characteristics 
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Table 18.1  Population by Age Group (percent of total population) 





















































Source: Data provided by Eduard Bos of the World Bank. 
18.2  Demographic and Fiscal Structures of Thailand 
Thailand had a population of about 60 million in  1995. Due to very high 
fertility rates in the 1960s and 1970s, the population is very young. As table 
18.1 shows, 52 percent of the population was under age 25 in 1993, whereas 
only 4 percent was over age 65. However, the rapid reduction in the fertility 
rate, from 5.4 to 2.8, experienced over the past 20 years combined with an 
increase in life expectancy will cause a significant change in the Thai popula- 
tion structure. As shown in table 18.1, by  the year 2030 the population under 
age 25 is predicted to fall to 36 percent, and the percentage of elderly over age 
65 will rise to 11 percent. In 2080, the corresponding numbers will be 3  1 and 
20 percent, respectively. 
The reduction of population growth rates in the 1980s was accompanied by 
an acceleration of economic growth. Between 1980 and 1990, Thailand’s GDP 
expanded at a rate of  8 percent per annum and continued to grow at this rate 
during the first half of  the 1990s. GNP per capita reached a level of  69,000 
baht,  or  about U.S.$2,760,  in  1995, characterizing Thailand as a  middle- 
income country at the level achieved by  Korea in mid-1980s. What is more, 
economic growth occurred with moderate levels of inflation. 
During the 1980s, annual inflation measured by  the percentage change in 
the GDP deflator averaged less than 4 percent per year. As a consequence of 
economic transformation, the Thai economy has a declining agricultural sec- 
tor, which in 1995 accounted for just 10.9 percent of GDP. In that year, indus- 
trial production accounted for 46.8 percent of  GDP, of  which 28.9 percent 
originated from manufacturing activities. 
Like many other Southeast Asian and East Asian countries before it, Thai- 
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garments, electronic components, electrical appliances, processed food, gems 
and jewelry, and traditional primary commodities such as rice, rubber, cassava, 
and  sugar  have  combined  to enable  Thailand  to  achieve  its  present  high 
economic growth rate. Thailand, however, is also a trade deficit country, with 
revenue from export trade that always falls below  its purchase of  imported 
goods. In  1995, for example, the trade deficit of Thailand amounted to some 
U.S.$14.9 billion. And although the service account shows some surplus, it 
was not large enough  to compensate  for this  huge  trade  deficit. Therefore, 
the current account deficit for that year was about U.S.$13.5 billion, or about 
8 percent  of  GDP. This high  level  of  current  account  deficit  has  worried 
Thai economic leaders, but some have argued that since Thailand‘s gross na- 
tional savings rate of  33.6 percent in 1995 is very high, the Thai current ac- 
count deficit was not being driven by overconsumption but rather by spending 
on investment  goods and by  a  desire  among  foreign  investors  to invest  in 
Thailand. 
This picture of  a fundamentally  sound Thai economy is reinforced by  an 
analysis of its fiscal policy. As a unitary state with a long history of indepen- 
dence and noncolonization by any Western powers, the government in Thailand 
is very centralized and has strong political power. And yet the size of the gov- 
ernment is not large by the standards of developed, industrialized countries as 
measured by the share of government revenue or expenditure in GDP. In 1961 
when  Thailand  launched  its first  national economic  development  plan,  the 
share of central government revenue in GDP was only about 10 percent. The 
share of government expenditure in the country’s GDP was slightly higher, at 
12 percent. Of course the role of the Thai government expanded with overall 
economic development as these shares increased in later years and peaked at 
around  16 percent  for revenue  and 20 percent  for expenditure  in the mid- 
1980s. The change in the absolute size of the government as seen through its 
revenue and expenditure shares of GDP could give a misleading or confusing 
picture of the role of  the Thai government  if  not seen within the context of 
other changes that had taken place in the structure and composition of govern- 
ment revenue and expenditure. This is what we turn to next. 
18.2.1  Government Revenue 
Strictly speaking, “government”  here means only central government.  So 
government revenue here does not include the revenues of the other two bodies 
of the public sector, namely, state-owned enterprises and local governments. If 
we assume, however, that state enterprises operate in a manner similar to pri- 
vate, commercial enterprises, their exclusion should not affect the traditional 
role of the state too much. As for local governments, their economic impor- 
tance in the context of the role of the public sector is small because the size of 
revenue of  local governments  has always been  around 5  or 6 percent of the 
central government’s. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to analyze the role of 417  Thailand’s Generational Accounts 
the Thai state by  looking only at the revenue (and expenditure) of the central 
government.* 
Tables 18.2A and 18.2B give the structure and distribution of revenue of the 
central government of Thailand between 1970 and 1995. It may be seen from 
this table that the major source of  government revenue was taxation, ranging 
between 90.3 1 and 92.73 percent of total revenue. While it was true that as in 
many  other developing economies, the majority of  tax revenues in Thailand 
came from indirect taxes, there has been a drastic change in the composition 
and proportion of direct taxes vis-8-vis indirect taxes during the past decade or 
so. For example, the share of  income taxes in  1970 was only  11.89 percent, 
whereas the share of indirect taxes was 76.37 percent. There was little change 
in the share of indirect taxes during the 1970s, but the beginning of the 1980s 
saw a downward shift of this share to around 68 percent. This downward shift 
continued in the first half of the 1990s, when the share of  indirect taxes was 
less than 60 percent. In  step with the gradual loss of  dominance of  indirect 
taxes in the Thai revenue structure is the rising share of direct tax revenue in 
total revenue. Indeed, this share doubled to 20.90 percent during 1981-85  and 
more than tripled to 32.01 percent in  1995. Looking inside the composition 
of  direct taxes, the contribution from corporate income tax is a major factor 
explaining the rapid increase of the direct tax share. In  1995, for example, the 
corporate income tax contributed a full 20.25 percent of the total revenue of 
the central government. Personal income tax also increased its share of total 
revenue (from 7.02 percent in 1970 to 11.34 percent in 1995), but not as fast 
as the corporate income tax. The direction makes clear, however, that the gov- 
ernment will attempt to improve its collection of  personal income tax from 
richer income earners. 
Within the indirect tax structure, three taxes have dominated. These are im- 
port duties, business taxes (and later the value-added tax), and excise or selec- 
tive sales taxes. During the past decade, however, one can see a drastic decline 
in the share of import taxes, from 29.21 percent in  1970 to 16.39 percent in 
1995.  This has been the result of gradual reduction in Thai import tariffs as the 
government tries to reduce the rate of protection of domestic industries and to 
liberalize its foreign trade under the agreements of greater regional and global 
cooperation in the form of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, the Asia Pacific Eco- 
nomic Cooperation, and the GATT Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the 
subsequent World Trade Organization. 
Beginning in 1995, the Thai authorities adopted a simplified tariff schedule 
whereby the number of tariff rates was reduced from about sixty to just five. 
These five rates were zero percent for raw  materials in short supply within 
the country, 5  percent for other raw  materials, 10 percent for intermediate 
2. Of  course, if and  when necessary, we  can  make some adjustments to central government 
figures by adding the revenue contributions of  local governments and state-owned enterprises. Table 18.2A  Structure of Central Government Revenue, 1970-95  (millions of baht) 
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Source: Bank of  Thailand, Monthly Bulletin (various years). Table 18.2B  Distribution of Central Government Revenue, 1970-95 (percent) 
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Source: Bank of  Thailand, Monthly Bulletin (various years). 420  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
products, 20 percent for finished manufactured products, and over 20 percent 
for products whose domestic protection was still needed. Specifically it is ex- 
pected that by  the year 2003, the tariff rates for all products  traded among 
ASEAN countries will be reduced to no more than 5 percent. 
In the 1950s taxes on rice exports were the largest revenue item for the gov- 
ernment. As the burden of these taxes was believed to fall on domestic produc- 
ers the majority of whom were poor, there was a concerted effort to abolish 
these taxes to reduce the tax burden as well as to increase the return to these 
farmers. The government  succeeded in removing rice export taxes and most 
other export taxes in the late 1980s. 
Another important indirect tax in Thailand is the business tax. This is a kind 
of sales tax levied on producers and importers of goods and services based on 
their gross sale receipts or import values. As each point of sale is subject to 
this tax it was in fact a turnover tax whose cascading effects were large and 
created distortions in resource allocation and posed an unfair burden on con- 
sumers. In the early 1980s, the Thai tax authorities had proposed to replace 
this indirect consumption tax with a value-added tax and spent more than  10 
years preparing for the eventual adoption of the new tax, which became a real- 
ity in 1992 with a consumption-type value-added tax with a beginning tax rate 
of 7 percent. The changeover caused a slight fall in tax collection in initial 
periods, but as the tax office gained experience the public became more famil- 
iar with the tax, value-added tax collection has begun to increase markedly in 
the past few years. 
Excise taxes in Thailand are levied on a few sumptuary items such as to- 
bacco and liquor and on petroleum products. The contributions of these taxes 
to overall revenue have always been large. In the future these excise taxes may 
even be used to supplement the single-rate value-added tax if more curbing of 
consumption is required. The contributions from fiscal monopolies and royal- 
ties have declined in share in recent years because the government has adopted 
greater liberalization and privatization policies, allowing price and other pro- 
duction and management adjustments in government agencies and state-owned 
enterprises. This privatization has shown some success recently as the contri- 
butions of these state-owned enterprises to the government have increased in 
the past few years. 
In all, it may be concluded that the Thai government has started to rely more 
on direct income taxes as a source of revenue. Indirect taxes, which were often 
regarded as regressive, have continued to lose their share. The use of a value- 
added tax has increased the efficiency of the tax system and also is expected 
to increase tax collection due to the built-in tax control. In the future, greater 
taxing power will be given to local governments, who will concentrate on prop- 
erty and wealth taxes, which are currently very weak. The size of the govern- 
ment in the future may grow if the present rapid economic growth continues 
as the government finds it necessary to spend more on public infrastructure as 421  Thailand’s Generational Accounts 
well as public welfare. This point will become clear as we look at government 
expenditure in the next subsection. 
In closing, we would like to make one comment about the state of personal 
income taxation in Thailand. As seen from table 18.2B, the personal income 
tax contributes only 11.34 percent to total revenue. As has been noted by many 
studies, including that of  Kakwani  (1997), income inequality in Thailand is 
extremely high. The Gini index of per capita income in 1992 was as high as 
0.53. It is possible that many people with high income are not paying their due 
share of  income tax. Rich people tend to consume more imported goods. Thus 
these people also benefit from a continuous lowering of tariffs. The govern- 
ment should be  looking at reforming personal income taxation  so that rich 
people pay their due share of taxation. This will also have an impact on the 
current account deficit because it will lower the propensity of rich people to 
consume imported goods. 
18.2.2  Government Expenditure 
As a rule, the Thai government decides how much it will spend each year 
on the strength of its revenue projection. If it expects healthy revenue collec- 
tion, the tendency to spend more is likely to be greater than when prospective 
public income is small. The practice of changing taxes or tax rates or raising 
other revenues  as a precondition for a package of future spending is simply 
not followed in Thailand. This does not mean, however, that the budget in 
Thailand must always be in balance. The government can, and often does, bor- 
row internally and externally to compensate for budget deficits and to finance 
public projects that it believes to be worthwhile  or important. However, past 
records have shown the Thai government  to be a cautious spender and bor- 
rower. This is due partly to budget laws that set effective controls on govern- 
ment borrowing and partly to the slow manner in which the government delib- 
erates on the benefits and costs of  public projects. As a result, Thailand has 
avoided foreign debt traps that have crushed many developing countries, espe- 
cially during the mid-1980s. 
Tables 18.3A and 18.3B show the structure and distribution of expenditure 
of the Thai government classified into budget type and function. First, the an- 
nual budget is classified into current and capital expenditure. Current expendi- 
ture includes the part of the budget that goes into wages and salaries of public 
officials and the maintenance of existing official services, whereas capital ex- 
penditure includes the purchase of land and other immovable properties, neces- 
sary equipment  and materials,  and the construction of public buildings and 
other infrastructure projects. It may be observed that during the  1970s and 
198Os, a large proportion  of the government budget was spent on current ex- 
penditure with little left for capital spending. This was necessary because of 
the relatively large size of public servants. Since the early 1980s, however, the 
government has frozen the expansion of the size of public servants to no more Table 18.3A  Government Expenditure Classified by Type and Function (millions of baht) 
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Source: Bank of Thailand, Monthly Bulletin (various issues). Table 18.3B  Distribution of Government Expenditure Classified by Type and Function (percent) 
1970  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  I995 
Total expenditures  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Economic classification 
Current  68.45  76.06  76.37  82.15 
Capital  3 1.55  23.94  23.63  17.85 
Economic services  29.14  23.16  21.20  16.81 
Social services  26.35  28.61  30.53  29.82 
Defense  17.52  19.21  19.57  20.02 
General administration and services  14.14  14.55  13.32  13.36 
Unallocated items  12.86  14.47  15.37  19.99 
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than 2 percent a year, which slowed down the share of current expenditure 
some years later. 
The slowdown in public expenditure during the mid-1980s was also appro- 
priate considering the fiscal difficulties that the government experienced with 
revenue shortfalls and huge budget deficits. However, the economy rebounded 
in the latter half of the 1980s with extraordinary export growth, a large influx 
of foreign investment, especially from Japan, and successful promotion of for- 
eign tourism in Thailand. This has led to unexpected increases in government 
revenue from all kinds of taxes, especially income and sales taxes. The eco- 
nomic boom in Thailand that started in 1987 continued until  1991 when the 
country suffered a slight setback due to internal political problems. During this 
period problems with infrastructure shortages became very apparent, prompt- 
ing the government to decide to spend more on infrastructure such as roads 
and rails, telecommunications,  power and utilities, and traffic management 
systems. By the early 1990s, the central government had already accumulated a 
large sum of treasury surplus, something experienced only once in the postwar 
history of Thailand. The government then started to spend on capital projects. 
From table 18.3B, it may be seen that the average share of capital expenditure 
in total government expenditure during 199  1-95  was 28.85 percent, compared 
to only 15.28 percent in the previous five years. This part of government spend- 
ing is still growing. In 1995, its share was 3 1.12 percent. 
More could be said about this pattern of  government spending during the 
past few years. During the start of the economic boom period during the last 
half of  the  1980s, the nonspending of  the government while taking in large 
fiscal surpluses acted in a beneficent countercyclical manner in the economy, 
effectively forestalling inflationary pressure. When the private-sector-led eco- 
nomic boom was coming to an end in the early 1990s, the government decided 
to use its large public savings on numerous public projects, thus easing the 
crash landing of the economy. This appropriate policy by the Thai government 
has won accolades from many international organizations such as the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank, although we must contend that the 
Thai government was just lucky. 
But how much luck will continue to befall the Thai government? Treasury 
reserves at the end of 1996 stood at more than U.S.$12 billion, the highest in 
recorded history. And indeed, it could be said that this huge budget surplus 
enabled the Thai authorities to agree to participate equally in the tripartite sys- 
tem of social security contributions. (They were not inclined to make any con- 
tributions earlier.) The economic slowdown in 1996 due to dismal performance 
in the export sector, high inflation, and the tight monetary situation gave a clear 
warning that the good times may have come to an end. The government may 
be required to return to its cautious mode of spending again. 
The bottom half of table 18.3B shows the distribution of government expen- 
ditures classified by function. Of the four major functions, namely, economic 
services, social services, defense, and general administration, social services 425  Thailand’s Generational Accounts 
now rank first in terms of share of total expenditure. Looking back to the situa- 
tion in the 1970s and 198Os, one can see an interesting change in the function 
of the Thai budget. The defense allocation, which was as high as 20 percent 
of total expenditure, gradually declined in the latter half of the 1980s, falling 
as low as 15.01 percent in 1995. Social services, which have traditionally as- 
sumed a major  share of the Thai budget  (because they include educational 
spending, which in the past was the largest budget item, and health spending, 
which has enjoyed a phenomenal rate of growth in the past decade and a half), 
have increased their share even more during this decade. And so have expendi- 
tures on economic services, which include spending on agricultural develop- 
ment and industrial infrastructure. The comparison between productive eco- 
nomic and social services and nonproductive defense spending alone should 
make most public finance specialists happy. 
It has been alluded to earlier that countries with limited transfer payments 
are likely to have more favorable generational policies. Will the recent changes 
in the budget composition of the Thai government make Thai generational ac- 
counts less favorable? No one could give a clear answer until empirical genera- 
tional accounting studies like this one could be undertaken frequently enough. 
It suffices to say at this juncture that it is unlikely that the Thai government 
will get carried away with spending on anything when the revenue situation 
does not warrant it. If  the government were  able to mobilize domestic re- 
sources in an efficient way,  it should be in a position to spend more on ne- 
glected sectors such as poverty and rural areas. Present Thai economic devel- 
opment has come about partly as a result of sacrifice of the agricultural sector 
and the farmers. It can only be proper to return more of the fruits of develop- 
ment to this sector and these people. 
Before concluding this section, a word should be said about fiscal incidence, 
or the impact of fiscal policy on the income distribution of  the country. We 
have maintained that despite the correct development policy of the Thai gov- 
ernment-giving  investment initiatives to the private sector during the past 
three decades of economic development while the government concentrated on 
infrastructure and other economic institution building-the  government has 
not done much in terms of poverty alleviation and the improvement of income 
inequality until recently. On poverty alleviation, the incidence of poverty based 
on the traditional poverty line stayed very high at around 20 percent throughout 
the 1970s and much of the 1980s. Only when the economy entered the private- 
sector-led economic boom in the latter part of the 1980s and early 1990s did 
the incidence of poverty show some marked reduction, mainly through the rise 
in personal or household income. On income inequality, a study by one of the 
present authors on the incidence of the Thai fiscal system during the 1960s and 
the early 1970s has shown that the equalizing effects of government expendi- 
ture were not large enough to overwhelm the disequalizing effects of govern- 
ment taxation, leading to, at best, a neutral overall effect of  fiscal policy on 
the Thai income distribution (Medhi 1980). Generational accounting can in- 426  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
deed be looked upon as a fiscal incidence study, but the impact is measured 
on people of different ages and sexes rather than on people with different in- 
comes. 
18.3  Construction of Generational Accounts 
Generational accounting is based on the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint. This constraint requires that the future net tax payments of current 
and future generations be sufficient, in present value, to cover the present value 
of future government consumption as well as to service the government’s initial 
net indebtedness3  In order to solve this budget constraint, we require (1) a pop- 
ulation projection, (2) projections of average net taxes by  age and sex, (3) an 
estimate of government net wealth, (4) a discount rate, and (5) a projection of 
government purchases. 
18.3.1  Population Projections 
Our demographic projection as shown in table 18.1 comes from the World 
Bank and incorporates its long-term forecasts for fertility and life e~pectancy.~ 
Specifically, total fertility is assumed to reach a level of 2.1 by the year 2000, 
which guarantees that the population slowly settles into a stationary distribu- 
tion. Life expectancy at birth is expected to increase from 65 years in  1990 to 
72 years in 2010,77 years in 2030, and 80 years in 2050. 
18.3.2  Projection of Taxes and Transfers 
Average tax and benefit payments by  age and sex were obtained from the 
1992 Socioeconomic Survey (SES) conducted by the National Statistical Of- 
fice, which is described in appendix B. In this survey, 13,458 households se- 
lected by  a two-stage cluster sampling were asked about their household in- 
come and expenditure and other household socioeconomic characteristics. In 
order to account for the different sizes of  clusters, observations are weighted 
according to their sampling probabilities. Since the survey provides data for 
total households as well as individuals, a calculation of  age- and sex-specific 
average payments is possible. In particular, data from the 1992 SES have been 
used to distribute by age and sex revenues from personal and corporate income 
taxes, monopoly profits, petroleum taxes, motor vehicle taxes, duties, state lot- 
tery revenues, and local taxes. Incidence assumptions are given in appendix C. 
In some cases, specific incidence assumptions were necessary. Personal in- 
come taxes, for example, are only available at the household level. They have 
been distributed to individual household members according to their share of 
3. Appendix A of this paper gives a brief discussion of the methodology of generational account- 
ing. Readers who are not familiar with the technique of generational accounting can find some 
technical information there. 
4.  We thank Eduard Bos of  the World Bank for providing us with special demographic tabula- 
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total household taxable income. We  proceed similarly with property taxes. 
Corporate taxes are allocated to individuals according to their wage and salary 
income since in a small open economy the capital tax incidence is on 1ab0r.~ 
Value-added taxes are distributed in proportion to household consumption and 
then divided within the family according to an equivalence scale that gives 
lower weight to children. Finally, excise taxes are divided equally among adult 
household members with the exception of petroleum and motor vehicle taxes, 
which are allocated only to the household head. 
As far as benefits are concerned, we distribute education and health expendi- 
tures by age and sex. Educational spending is allocated evenly among all indi- 
viduals attending schools and universities. Payments of old-age pensions to 
former government workers are included with government spending on goods 
and services since these payments may be viewed as part of the compensation 
package that the Thai government needed to offer these workers to solicit their 
employment. Unfortunately, there are no data available to allocate health care 
expenditure by  age and sex. For this profile, we used the corresponding Ger- 
man profile of relative health expenditures by  age and sex described in Gok- 
hale, Raffelhiischen, and Walliser (1994). The German data entail higher per 
capita health care expenditures by  age, with per capita expenditures on 80- 
year-olds equal to roughly twice that on 40-year-olds. All raw profiles obtained 
in the described manner have then been smoothed with an eighth-order polyno- 
mial. Finally, we rescale all average tax and benefit payments to accord with 
1993 fiscal aggregates.6 
18.3.3  Government Net Wealth 
We  take government financial wealth as our estimate for 1993 government 
net worth. As previously mentioned, this number is 224.6 billion baht, or 6.4 
percent of GDP in 1993. 
18.3.4  Growth and Discount Rates 
For productivity growth we assume a rate of 2 percent per year, in line with 
other recent studies of the Thai economy (see Hagemann, Amieva-Huerta, and 
Ross 1992). Future government receipts are risky, which suggests that they be 
discounted with a higher rate than the real interest on government securities. 
However, government receipts and expenditures appear less volatile than the 
return on capital, which suggests that they be discounted with a lower rate than 
5. See Fehr and Kotlikoff (chap. 3 in this volume) for an analysis of the capital tax incidence in 
a small open economy. 
6. We  have used the fiscal aggregates of  1993 as a proper consequence of the  availability of 
household income and expenditure statistics for  1992 (the 1992 SES). At  the end of  1996, the 
latest socioeconomic survey data-the  1994 SES-also  became available, which should enable 
us to construct generational accounts for  1995. But  the  time  and  resources needed to analyze 
the  new data set were not available, so we have to contend with the fiscal situation of  1993 for 
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that.’ Our discount rate of 6 percent therefore reflects a long-term risk-free 
interest rate augmented by a risk premium but is smaller that the rate of return 
on capital. 
18.3.5  Government Consumption 
Finally, we assume that government spending after  1993 grows with the 
overall economy. For 1993, government spending is calculated as the sum of 
all non-age-specific government expenditures net of revenues not distributed by 
age and sex. In this calculation, profits from state enterprises and other nontax 
revenues are treated as negative government spending. 
18.4  Results 
18.4.1  Major Findings 
Tables 18.4A and 18.4B present generational accounts for the Thai male and 
female populations, respectively. The accounts exhibit a life cycle pattern with 
the maximum expected future net payment peaking at age 30 for males and 
age 25 for females. Male newborns, whose generational accounts reflect their 
entire lifetime net tax payments, can anticipate a net tax burden of $7,700 in 
present value. For females, the lifetime net tax burden is $4,000. The highest 
expected tax burden facing these newborns comes from corporate income tax, 
followed by value-added taxes and other excise taxes. This is not surprising; 
developing countries rely heavily on indirect taxes and corporate taxes since 
the  collection  of  personal  income taxes requires  a fairly  sophisticated  tax 
system. 
The age pattern of  the present  value of  future taxes differs for each tax. 
Whereas the present values of remaining lifetime personal income taxes and, 
due to our incidence assumption, corporate taxes peak between ages 25 and 
30, the present value of remaining lifetime property taxes peaks at age 45. 
Clearly, corporate and personal income taxes reflect the present value of ex- 
pected future wages and salaries whereas property taxes depend on wealth, 
which  is accumulated  more  slowly over the life cycle. Additionally, some 
taxes, specifically value-added taxes and other consumption taxes, are more 
evenly spread over the life cycle than are, say, personal income taxes. Note 
that generational accounts at all ages are positive. This is in contrast to most 
developed countries, which show generational accounts eventually becoming 
negative due to welfare programs targeted at the elderly. 
Tables 18.4A and 18.4B also indicate that the residual fiscal burden facing 
future generations is negative. If  current Thais make the remaining lifetime 
net tax payments indicated in these tables, the Thai government will have suf- 
ficient resources to provide a very large subsidy to future Thais. Is this result 
7. For a more detailed discussion of  the choice of  a discount rate, see Auerbach et al. (1991, 
1994). Table 18.4A  Composition of Male Generational  Accounts: Present Value of Receipts and Payments (thousands of baht) 
~ 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Property  Alcohol  Petroleum 
Generation’s  Net  Personal  Corporate  and  and  and  State  University 

















































































21.5  43.8  16.6 
26.0  48.2  20.2 
31.2  52.1  24.5 
37.4  54.2  29.1 
44.8  54.5  34.7 
53.4  53.1  35.5 
62.5  50.3  33.9 
71.3  46.7  30.4 
77.6  42.4  25.8 
79.7  37.6  21.0 
76.9  32.7  16.6 
68.9  27.8  13.0 
56.7  23.2  10.3 
41.9  19.0  8.3 
27.5  15.3  6.6 
14.6  11.5  4.9 
6.1  8.6  3.4 
1.6  6.4  2.2 
0.2  4.2  1.1 
41.8  41.6  1.3 
50.8  45.9  1.6 
61.3  49.5  1.9 
74.0  51.6  2.3 
88.3  51.8  2.7 
100.3  50.5  2.9 
105.5  47.9  2.8 
103.1  44.4  2.5 
93.9  40.3  2.1 
80.5  35.8  1.7 
66.1  31.1  1.4 
52.8  26.4  1.1 
41.9  22.0  0.8 
32.9  18.0  0.7 
25.2  14.6  0.5 
17.7  10.9  0.3 
11.8  8.2  0.2 
7.4  6.1  0.1 


























































Note:  Productivity growth assumed to be 2 percent; discount rate, 6 percent. Table 18.4B  Composition of Female Generational Accounts: Present Value of Receipts and Payments (thousands of baht) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Property  Alcohol  Petroleum 
Generation’s  Net  Personal  Corporate  and  and  and  State  University 





















84.2  13.8 
96.4  16.8 
139.9  20.3 
192.2  24.7 
224.2  28.4 
239.1  30.6 
236.1  30.5 
218.1  28.1 
191.2  23.9 
160.2  18.6 
131.2  13.3 
107.4  8.6 
90.3  5.0 
77.8  2.8 
67.8  I .6 
57.5  1.1 
46.2  0.9 
32.4  0.6 





















11.5  45.4  14.0 
13.9  50.0  17.0 
16.6  54.2  20.5 
19.8  56.7  24.8 
23.9  57.2  28.4 
28.9  55.1  28.9 
33.7  52.6  27.6 
35.4  48.6  25.1 
34.3  44.2  22.0 
31.3  39.6  18.8 
28.1  31.3  15.9 
26.0  27.1  13.6 
25.6  23.1  11.6 
26.2  19.1  10.0 
26.4  15.3  8.3 
25.0  12.1  6.7 
21.5  9.2  5.2 
15.0  5.8  3.1 

















6.  I 
3.8 
1.6 
43.2  1.3 
47.6  1.6 
51.5  1.9 
53.9  2.3 
54.4  2.6 
53.0  2.7 
50.0  2.6 
46.2  2.4 
42. I  2.0 
37.7  1.7 
33.5  1.3 
29.5  1 .0 
25.8  0.8 
22.0  0.6 
18.2  0.5 
14.5  0.3 
11.5  0.2 
8.7  0.2 
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Table 18.5  Sensitivity Analysis: Percentage Difference between Generational 
Accounts of Newborns and Future Generations for Alternative 
Growth and Interest Rates 
Growth Rate (%) 




-218.6  -  155.2  -111.5 
-  307.0  -215.8  -153.8 
-435.9  -301.9  -213.0 
Source: See text. 
surprising? Not if  one reconsiders the demographic and fiscal scenario. Re- 
member, 52.2 percent of the 1993 population was less than 25 years old. Under 
baseline policy, all these people can be expected to contribute net payments of 
between $6,128 and $16,852 in present value. Given that the Thai government 
already runs a surplus, this implies a very large accumulation of government 
wealth over the next 40 years, when the currently young are at their peak earn- 
ing years, which can be used to subsidize the next generation. Additionally, the 
aging of the Thai population will not, under baseline policy, put a substantial 
strain on government expenditures because there is, under baseline policy, no 
national social security system that would potentially leave elderly Thais with 
negative annual net taxes. 
Table 18.5 demonstrates that our finding that baseline Thai policy is, genera- 
tionally  speaking, highly favorable holds for a range of  interest  and growth 
rates. Though the percentage difference in lifetime net tax payments between 
current and future newborns varies somewhat, in all cases future generations 
are much better off than are current newborns. In fact, if we were to balance 
the burden between currently living generations in the base case we could per- 
manently lower personal and corporate income taxes, value-added taxes, and 
property tax by about 70 percent. Alternatively, a reduction of all taxes by 36 
percent would suffice. Would we recommend such a policy? No, particularly 
given the introduction of pay-as-you-go  social security by  the Thai govern- 
ment. 
1  8.4.2  The Generational Implications of Introducing 
Pay-As-You-Go Social Security 
We now consider how our generational accounts change with the Thai gov- 
ernment’s introduction of  a pay-as-you-go  system in  1993. In particular  we 
follow the current plan by choosing a level of aggregate social security benefits 
equal to 9 percent of wages and assuming that a third of these benefits will be 
financed by the Thai budgetary surplus without raising taxes and the rest fi- 
nanced through a payroll tax.*  All revenues are divided equally among the pop- 
8. We  assume a GDP labor share of  SO percent, consistent with the estimate in Ranee and 
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ulation over the age 65. Tables 18.6A and 18.6B present the results for males 
and females, respectively. Since payroll taxes are allocated according to wage 
income, they are included in the corporate tax column. Social security benefits 
are shown in a separate column. All other payments remain unchanged. Com- 
pared to the baseline results, net payments of male newborns are reduced since 
they can now expect social security benefits over 48,000 baht in present value 
exceeding the present value of payroll taxes by 11,000  baht. Furthermore, ac- 
counts of males over age 55 turn negative, indicating that future benefits exceed 
future tax payments in present value. Similar results hold for females. Net pay- 
ments of female newborns are reduced by more than those of males due to a 
lower payroll tax burden facing females. 
Despite the reduction of net payments by living generations, future genera- 
tions are still better off than current newborns assuming a 2 percent growth 
rate and a 6 percent discount rate. Note though that their net tax payments are 
now positive; under pay-as-you-go  social security, future generations can no 
longer expect a net transfer from the government. Table 18.7 recognizes the 
introduction of pay-as-you-go social security in 1993 and shows the percentage 
difference between lifetime net tax payments of current and future newborns 
under alternative discount and growth rates. As table 18.7 indicates, in a high- 
growth environment future generations may face considerably higher lifetime 
net tax burdens than current newborns as a result of introducing pay-as-you- 
go social security. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, because the expenditures 
of the existing welfare system are more likely to grow until 2030 than in our 
base-case social security simulation, we find that future generations must pay 
net taxes that are 40.7 percent higher than those of 1993 newborns. 
18.5  Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has applied generational accounting-a  new method of assessing 
the sustainability of fiscal policy-to  Thailand. We find that Thailand's current 
fiscal policy is, generationally speaking, very favorable. Indeed, it is favorable 
enough that future Thais are likely to bear substantially smaller fiscal burdens 
and might even be, on net, subsidized by the fiscal system. This finding could, 
however, be reversed by the planned introduction in Thailand of a pay-as-you- 
go social security  system. Depending on the scale and other features of  the 
system, this policy could leave future Thais with a significantly higher growth- 
adjusted lifetime net tax burden than that faced by current Thais. Consequently, 
this  paper's  message  for  Thailand  is that  it  should  consider  introducing  a 
funded, rather than an unfunded, social security system if it wants to preserve 
its well-deserved reputation for fiscal prudence and generational responsibility. 
Lest our readers feel too uncomfortable about our analysis of pay-as-you-go 
social security in Thailand and its impact on the balance of intergenerational 
burden, we would offer a caveat that the Thai government has been very careful 
about the present and future operations of  its social security fund. Although it 
is not a fully funded system, the present Thai social security system has started Table 18.6A  Composition of Male Generational Accounts with Social Security: Present Value of Receipts and Payments (thousands  of baht) 
~  ~  ~  ~ 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
property  Alcohol  Petmleum 
Generation’s  Net  Personal  Corporate  and  and  and  State  University  Edu-  Social 































































89.6  21.5  43.8  16.6  41.8  41.6  I .3 
109.2  26.0  48.2  20.2  50.8  45.9  1.6 
132.4  31.2  52.1  24.5  61.3  49.5  1.9 
158.9  37.4  54.2  29.7  74.0  51.6  2.3 
181.9  44.8  54.5  34.7  88.3  51.8  2.7 
194.7  53.4  53.1  35.5  100.3  50.5  2.9 
192.2  62.5  50.3  33.9  105.5  47.9  2.8 
175.3  71.3  46.7  30.4  103.1  44.4  2.5 
146.1  71.6  42.4  25.8  93.9  40.3  2.1 
110.2  79.7  37.6  21.0  80.5  35.8  1 .l 
14.0  76.9  32.1  16.6  66.1  31.1  1.4 
42.6  68.9  27.8  13.0  52.8  26.4  1.1 
19.5  56.7  23.2  10.3  41.9  22.0  0.8 
5.8  41.9  19.0  8.3  32.9  18.0  0.7 
0.4  21.5  15.3  6.6  25.2  14.6  0.5 
0  14.6  11.5  4.9  11.7  10.9  0.3 
0  6.1  8.6  3.2  11.8  8.2  0.2 
0  1.6  6.4  2.2  7.4  6.1  0.  I 
0  0.2  4.2  1.1  4.0  4.0  0.1 
61.0  20.1  6.9  51.7 
71.6  22.0  8.4  60.8 
82.6  24.1  10.2  40.1 
12.4  10.5  95.5  26.3 
9.7  1.1  111.0  28.0 
2.8  0.2  129.6  29.0 
151.8  29.1  0.7  0 
0.2  0  178.6  28.9 
0  211.9  28.4  0 
0  253.3  21.7  0 
0  308.3  26.7  0 
0  0  384.9  25.4 
0  496.2  23.5  0 
0  656.9  21.1  0 
0  0  539.4  17.6 
429.6  14.1  0  0 
0  0  340.6  11.2 
0  0  265.6  8.7 
0  0  178.6  5.9 
Note: Productivity growth assumed to be 2 percent; discount rate, 6 percent. Table 18.6B  Composition of Female Generational Accounts with Social Security: Present Value of Receipts and Payments (thousands of baht) 
Tax Payments  Transfer Receipts 
Property  Alcohol  Petroleum 
Generation’s  Net  Personal  Corporate  and  and  and  State  University  Edu-  Social 




























































48.1  11.5  45.4  14.0 
58.6  13.9  50.0  17.0 
71.0  16.6  54.2  20.5 
85.7  19.8  56.7  24.8 
94.3  23.9  57.2  28.4 
95.1  28.9  55.1  28.9 
87.5  33.1  52.6  27.6 
73.3  35.4  48.6  25.1 
55.4  34.3  44.2  22.0 
37.0  31.3  39.6  18.8 
21.4  28.1  35.2  15.9 
10.1  26.0  31.1  13.6 
3.5  25.6  27.1  11.6 
0.8  26.2  23.1  10.0 
0.1  26.4  19.1  8.3 
0  25.0  15.3  6.7 
0  21.5  12.1  5.2 
0  15.0  9.2  3.7 
0  5.6  5.8  2.1 
7.2  43.2  1.3 
8.7  47.6  I .6 
10.4  51.5  1.9 
12.4  53.9  2.3 
14.3  54.4  2.6 
15.9  53.0  2.7 
17.3  50.0  2.6 
18.1  46.2  2.4 
18.6  42.1  2.0 
18.5  37.7  1.7 
18.0  33.5  I .3 
17.1  29.5  I .0 
15.7  25.8  0.8 
13.8  22.0  0.6 
11.3  18.2  0.5 
8.6  14.5  0.3 
6.1  11.5  0.2 
3.8  8.7  0.2 







































61.0  20.1 
71.6  22.0 
82.6  24.1 
95.9  26.3 
111.0  28.0 
129.6  29.0 
151.8  29.1 
178.6  28.9 
211.9  28.4 
253.3  27.7 
308.3  26.7 
384.9  25.4 
496.2  23.5 
656.9  21.1 
539.4  17.6 
429.6  14.1 
340.6  11.2 
265.6  8.7 
178.6  5.9 
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Table 18.7  Sensitivity Analysis: Percentage Difference between Generational 
Accounts of Newborns and Future Generations for Alternative 
Growth and Interest Rates with Social Security 
Growth Rate (%) 




-30.4  -11.1  -65.7 
-73.4  -28.8  -  12.3 
-  127.4  -71.1  -27.3 
Source: See text. 
with a large reserve fund as a result of  very few claims during the first few 
years of  operations and generous financial support from the government. Its 
current financial condition should go a long way toward cushioning future con- 
tingencies. Moreover, the government has aggressively sought ways to profit- 
ably invest this fund at this early stage of  social security operations so as to 
expand its financial capability. It has also expressed deep interest in adopting 
a microsimulation study of how Thais will work and spend in the future so that 
it can even be more prepared to face future financial emergency. These facts 
should allay some fear that the present social security system is generation- 
ally unsound. 
Appendix A 
Methodology of Generational Accounting 
Generational accounting is based on the government’s intertemporal budget 
c~nstraint.~  This constraint, written as equation (Al), requires that the future 
net tax payments of  current and future generations be sufficient, in present 
value, to cover the present value of future government consumption as well as 
to service the government’s initial net indebtedness:  lo 
The first summation on the left-hand side of equation (Al)  adds together the 
generational accounts (the present value of  the remaining lifetime net pay- 
ments) of existing generations. The term Nr,k  stands for the account of the gen- 
9. This section only briefly describes the method of  generational accounting. For an in-depth 
10. It is not necessary to repay the debt in order to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint. 
explanation of  the methodology, see Auerbach et al. (1991). 
It is enough that the growth rate of debt not exceed the discount rate. 436  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
eration born in year k. The index s in this summation runs from age 0 to age 
D,  the maximum length of life.” 
The second summation on the left-hand side of equation (Al) adds together 
the present values of remaining net payments of future generations. The first 
term on the right-hand side of  equation (Al) expresses the present value of 
government consumption. In this summation the value of  government con- 
sumption in year s, given by  G,, is discounted by the pretax real interest rate, 
r. The remaining term on the right-hand side, W;, denotes the government’s net 
wealth in year t, its assets minus its debt. 
Equation (Al)  indicates the zero-sum nature of intergenerational fiscal pol- 
icy. Holding the present value of government consumption fixed, a reduction 
in the present value of net taxes extracted from current generations (a decline 
in the first summation on the left-hand side of  eq. [All) necessitates an in- 
crease in the present value of net tax payments of future generations. 
The term Nr,k  is defined by 
k+D 
Nr,k =  q,k%,k(l  +  r)-(s-t).  (A2) 
In expression (A2) q,k  stands for the projected average net tax payment to the 
government made in year s by a member of the generation born in year k. The 
term Ps,k  stands for the number of surviving members of the cohort in year s 
who were born in year k. For generations who are born in year k, where k >  t,  , 
the summation begins in year k. Regardless of the generation’s year of birth, 
the discounting is always back to year t. 
A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of Nt,k,  one for each 
existing and future generation, with the property that the combined present 
values add up to the right-hand side of equation (Al). Though we distinguish 
between male and female cohorts in our results, we suppress sex subscripts in 
equations (Al)  and (A2) to ease notation. 
Note that generational accounts reflect only taxes paid less transfers re- 
ceived. With the exception of  government expenditures on education, which 
are treated as transfer payments, the accounts do not impute to particular gener- 
ations the value of the government’s purchases of goods and services because 
it is difficult to attribute the benefits of such purchases. Therefore, the accounts 
do not show the full net benefit or burden that any generation receives from 
government policy as a whole, although they can show a generation’s net bene- 
fit or burden from a particular policy change that affects only taxes and trans- 
fers. Thus generational accounting tells us which  generations will pay  for 
government spending, rather than  which  generations will benefit from the 
spending. 
s=max(r+k) 
11. Hence, the first element of this summation is N,,,,  which is the present value of net payments 
of the generation born in year t; the last term is N,,,-,,  the present value of remaining net payments 
of the oldest generation alive in year I, namely, those born in year f -  D. 437  Thailand’s Generational Accounts 
Assessing the Fiscal Burden Facing Future Generations. Given the right-hand 
side of equation (Al)  and the first term on the left-hand side of equation (Al), 
we determine, as a residual the value of the second term on the right-hand side 
of equation (Al), which is the collective payment, measured as a time t present 
value, required of future generations. Based on this amount, we determine the 
average present value lifetime net tax payment of each member of each future 
generation under the assumption that the average lifetime tax payment of suc- 
cessive generations rises at the economy’s rate of productivity growth. (This 
makes the lifetime payment a constant share of lifetime income.) Leaving out 
this growth adjustment, the lifetime net tax payments of future generations are 
directly comparable with those of  current newborns,  since the generational 
accounts of  both newborns and future generations take into account net tax 
payments over these generations’ entire lifetimes. Note that our assumption 
that the generational accounts of all future generations are equal, except for a 
growth adjustment, is just one of many assumptions we could make about the 
distribution  across future generations  of  their collective net payment to the 
government. We could, for example, assume a phase-in of the additional fiscal 
burden (positive or negative) to be imposed on future generations, allocating a 
greater share of the burden to later future generations and a smaller share to 
earlier ones. Clearly, such a phase-in would mean that generations born after 
the phase-in period has elapsed would face larger values of  lifetime burdens 
(the NJ  than we are calculating here. 
Appendix B 
Thailand 5. Socioeconomic Survey 1992 
The present study uses data obtained from the SES 1992. Although the Na- 
tional Statistical Office (NSO) of Thailand conducted its first household ex- 
penditure survey in 1957, it did not begin to conduct these surveys on regular 
basis until 1968-69.  The surveys were repeated every five years. In 1986, the 
NSO started conducting the surveys every two years. The SES 1992 is the 
eleventh survey of this kind. The survey covered all private, noninstitutional 
households residing permanently in municipal areas, sanitary districts (a form 
of administrative unit), and villages. However, it excluded that part of the popu- 
lation living in transient hotels or rooming houses, boarding schools, military 
barracks, temples, hospitals, prisons, and other such institutions (NSO 1994). 
Sampling Design 
The simplest household survey would be one in which each household has 
an equal probability of being selected. This is called simple random sampling. 
It is impractical to conduct large surveys in which each household in the popu- 438  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
Table 18B.1  Number of BlockslVillages Sampled 
Region 
Municipal  Sanitary  Nonmunicipal 
Areas  Districts  Areas  Total 
North  54  83  222  359 
Northeast  41  84  264  389 
Centre  54  84  I97  335 
South  54  71  154  279 
Bangkok Metropolis  249  0  0  249 
Remainder  12  18  33  63 
Total  464  340  870  1,674 
lation has an equal chance of inclusion. It is more economical and efficient to 
use stratified sampling procedures. The SES surveys were conducted using a 
stratified two-stage cluster sampling. 
The entire country was divided into six regions: (1) North, (2) Northeast, 
(3) Centre (excluding regions 5 and 6), (4) South, (5) Bangkok Metropolis, 
(6) Remainder (Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakan). Each region 
was further divided into three parts according to the type of local administra- 
tion, namely, municipal areas, sanitary districts, and nonmunicipal areas out- 
side sanitary districts. Thus the sampling design consisted of  18 strata, 3 strata 
in each region. The primary sampling units were blocks for municipal areas 
and sanitary districts, villages for nonmunicipal areas outside sanitary districts. 
At the first stage of  sampling, blockdvillages  were randomly  selected from 
each stratum by  using probability  proportional to size (the total number of 
households).  The  total  number  of  blocks/villages  was  1,674, from  77,981 
blocks/villages. 
Table 18B.1 presents the number of blocks/villages sampled from each stra- 
tum. The secondary  sampling units  were the private  households  that  were 
sampled from each selected blockhillage. A systematic sample of  15 house- 
holds was selected from each of sample blocks, while 9 and 7 households were 
selected from each of sample villages in  sanitary districts and nonmunicipal 
areas outside sanitary districts,  respectively. Table  18B.2 presents  the total 
number of sample private households selected for enumeration. 
It is often the case that not all households selected in the sample respond. 
Some households are unwilling to respond, and others provide incorrect infor- 
mation. Also errors are made in recording  and coding data. The sample of 
households finally selected in the survey is smaller than the number of initially 
selected households. The difference between the two causes nonsampling er- 
rors in the survey. If the nonresponding households are distributed uniformly 
across various groups, the impact of  nonsampling error is small. Since it is 
difficult to know the distribution of nonresponding households, it is not pos- 
sible to estimate the overall degree of accuracy in the survey results. 
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Table 18B.2  Number of Sample Households Selected for Enumeration 
Municipal  Sanitary  Nonmunicipal 
Region  Areas  Districts  Areas  Total 
North  8 10  747  1,554  3,111 
Northeast  615  756  1,848  3,219 
Centre  810  756  1,379  2,945 
south  810  639  1,078  2,527 
Bangkok Metropolis  3,735  0  0  3,735 
Remainder  180  162  23 1  573 
Total  6,960  3,060  6,090  16,110 
Table 18B.3  Actual Numbers of Private Households Selected in Survey 
Municipal  Sanitary  Nonmunicipal 
Region  Areas  Districts  Areas  Total 
North  614  665  1,441  2,720 
Northeast  507  667  1,737  2,911 
Centre  628  633  1,274  2,535 
south  632  546  964  2,142 
Bangkok Metropolis  2,698  0  0  2,698 
Remainder  129  130  193  452 
Total  5,208  2,641  5,609  13,458 
Table 18B.4  Nonsampling Error by Region and Community 
Municipal  Sanitary  Nonmunicipal 
Region  Areas  Districts  Areas  Total 
North  24.20  10.98  7.27  12.57 
Northeast  17.56  11.77  6.01  9.57 
Centre  22.47  6.33  12.74  25.35 
south  21.98  14.55  10.58  2 1.42 
Bangkok Metropolis  27.76  0  0  27.76 
Remainder  28.33  19.75  16.45  21.12 
Total  25.17  13.69  7.90  16.46 
The percentage differences between tables 18B.2 and 18B.3 provide the mag- 
nitude of  nonresponding households (expressed in percentage). These results 
are presented in table 18B.4. 
Of 16,110 households initially selected, 13,458 households were eligible for 
inclusion in the survey, giving a response rate of 83.54 percent. The response 
rate of 83.54 percent can be considered satisfactory considering the nature of 
the survey. It is interesting to note from table 18B.4 that the nonresponse rate 
is much higher in urban areas than in rural areas. In Bangkok Metropolis, the 440  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
nonresponse rate is very high, 27.76 percent compared to the average nonre- 
sponse rate of 16.46 percent for the whole country. Since the sample size is so 
large in Bangkok, however, a higher level of  nonresponse will not bias the 
results too much. 
Weighting Sampling Observations 
Expansion factors (“weights”) need to be inserted in respondent household 
records to enable the data provided by  these households to be expanded to 
obtain estimates for the defined population. For instance, if N is the total num- 
ber of households in the population and n is the number of households selected 
in the survey, the weight attached to the ith household will be given by 
(Bl)  w,  = - such that  C w,  =  N  (the total household population). 
The weight in equation (B  1) is derived on the assumption that every household 
in the population has exactly the same probability of  being  selected in  the 
survey. Generally, the design of the survey will not imply that each household 
in the population has exactly the same probability of being selected. Hence the 
weight given to each respondent household must be determined by its probabil- 
ity of  selection within a stratum adjusted to take account of  nonresponding 
households. This is what we do below. 
Let k be the serial number of a household andj  the serial number of a block/ 
village. Index areas by  i, where i is  1 for municipal areas, 2 for sanitary dis- 
tricts, and 3 for nonmunicipal areas outside sanitary districts. Index regions by 
h, where h is  1 for North, 2 for Northeast, 3 for Centre, 4 for South, 5 for 
Bangkok Metropolis, and 6 for Remainder. Now  suppose Nh, and Ph, are the 
total number of  households selected for enumeration and the probability of 
selection in  the jth sample blockhillage,  ith area, and hth  region, respec- 
tively, then 
N  “ 
n  ,=I 
will be the estimated number of population households in the ith area and hth 
region. HL, will be the same in each selected blockhillage because the proba- 
bility of  selecting a blockhillage is proportional to the number of households 
in each population blockhillage. If mhi  is the number of sample blocks/villages 
selected in the ith area and hth region, then Hht/mhL  will be the estimated num- 
ber of population households allocated to each of the selected blocWvillages. 
If nh,, is the number of interviewed households in the ith area, hth region, and 
jth blockhillage, then the estimated number of  population households allo- 
cated to the kth interviewed household in the ith area, hth region, andjth block 
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Table 18B.5  Number of Households  as of July 1992 
Region 
~ 
Municipal  Sanitary  Nonmunicipal 
Areas  Districts  Areas  Total 
North  278,376  352,525  2,405,145  3,036,046 
Northeast  247,841  374,332  4,063,994  4,686,167 
Centre  3,242,666  455,988  2,052,994  235  1,648 
South  303,126  144,158  1,484,637  1,931,921 
Remainder  374,691  156,506  306,392  837,589 
Total  3 1,996,486  1,483,509  10.3 13,162  14,996,486 
Bangkok Metropolis  1,653.1 15  -  -  1,653,115 
where HL, will be the same number for all interviewed households in the ith 
area, hth region, andjth block. Note that 
HLi is the estimated number of population households in the ith area and hth 
region. Suppose Hhi  is the actual number of population households, based on 
the household projections as obtained from NSO (1994; see table 18B.5),  then 
the household weight attached to each interviewed household will be given by 
where WhUk  = Who  for all k. 
Note from equation (B3) that 
and if H is the total number of households in the entire population, then 
63 
= c  Hht. 
h=l  ,=I 
From table 18B.5, it can be seen that the total number of households in Thai- 
land is 14,996,486.  If we multiply the household size by its household weight, 
we get the population weight for each household. If we add all the population 
weights, we get unbiased estimates of the population in Thailand. The popula- 
tion estimates are presented in table 18B.6. 442  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
Table 18B.6  Population as of July 1992 (millions) 
Region 
Mu  n  i  c  i  p  a  I  Sanitary  Nonrnunicipal 









































The total population of Thailand is estimated to be 58.15 million. The popu- 
lation of Bangkok Metropolis is 5.54 million. Of the total population in Thai- 
land 71.83 percent lives in nonmunicipal areas outside sanitary districts. Thus 
a large majority of population in Thailand lives in rural areas. 
Appendix C 
Incidence Assumptions 
DeJnition of  Taxable Income. The following income sources can be allocated 
to individuals who earn them (whose age and sex are given): (I) wage and 
salary;  (2)  profit,  nonfarm;  (3) profit  from  farm;  (4)  transfer  payments; 
(5) property income; and (6)  other money receipts, Taxable income is defined 
as total money income minus all taxes paid. We obtained the individual age 
and sex profiles for taxable income and property income. 
Income Tux (method I). Income tax was available at the household level. From 
the taxable incomes of individuals we calculated the taxable income for each 
household. Given taxable income and income tax for each household, we com- 
puted the tax rate for each household. Given this information, we allocated the 
household income tax to each individual within the household in proportion to 
the taxable income of  the individual (using the household tax rate). This al- 
lowed us to calculate the age and sex profile for each individual. This proce- 
dure does not assume that the income tax is proportional to the taxable income 
in the country. The assumption of proportionality is rather strong because the 
income tax is generally progressive. In the above allocation, we assumed that 
income tax is proportional within each household. This is not entirely satisfac- 
tory, but it is better that assuming that taxes are proportional in the entire econ- 
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tax. The assumption of proportionality would allocate taxes to households and 
then to individuals even if these households did not actually pay any income 
tax. 
Income Tax (method 2). This method allocates income tax to individuals in 
proportion to their taxable income. This method assumes that income tax is 
proportional in the economy. This method is less accurate than method 1. 
Property  Tax  (method 1). This method  is exactly  the  same as income tax 
method  1. The property tax is available at the household level and property 
income at the individual level. So we calculated the tax rates for each house- 
hold and allocated property tax to individuals within the households in propor- 
tion to each individual's share of property income. 
Property  Tax (method 2). The property tax is allocated to individuals within 
the economy in proportion to the individual's  property income. This method 
assumes proportionality in the economy. 
Corporate Tax. We assumed that corporate income taxes are borne by labor 
because of international capital mobility. So we allocated corporate taxes in 
proportion  to wage and salary income, which is available at the individual 
level, giving immediately the age and sex profile of corporate taxes. 
Value-Added Tax (VAT). The value-added tax was allocated to households in 
proportion to each household's total expenditure. The allocation of VAT within 
households was done in proportion to the following equivalence scale: 
Age 0-5  years  0.5 
Age 6-11  years  0.6 
Age 12-15  years  0.7 
Age 16-18  years  0.8 
Age 18+ years  1  .o 
We used this equivalence scale in order to take account of the differing needs 
of household members of different ages. 
Import Duty. The allocation of import duty follows exactly the same procedure 
as for VAT. 
Tobacco, Alcohol, and State Lottery. Taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and gambling 
were allocated to households in proportion to household expenditures on these 
items. Within households, these taxes are allocated only to adults (giving zero 
weight to children aged 18 or younger). This is referred to as method 1. Since 
in Asian countries, alcohol and tobacco are generally consumed by males only, 
in method 2 none of these taxes are allocated to females within households. 444  Nanak Kakwani and Medhi Krongkaew 
Petroleum Products and Motor Vehicles. The excise on petroleum products and 
motor vehicles is allocated to the household head according to the household 
consumption of these items. 
Expenditures  on Education. Current and capital expenditures on education 
were allocated in proportion to the number of persons attending school or uni- 
versity. In Thailand about 22 percent of the population is attending school of 
some kind. University expenditures were allocated to individuals attending a 
university and other educational expenditures were allocated to individuals at- 
tending institutions and schools other than a university. 
Social Security. Expenditure on social security is allocated to the household 
head according to pensions and disability payments received by the household. 
It should be noted that the Thai government gives pensions only to govem- 
ment employees. 
Local Government Revenue. In 1993-94,  local government revenue was 41.3 
billion baht,  which  on dividing by  population  gives a per person  tax  (per 
month) paid equal to 813.5 baht. This amount can be allocated to individuals 
in proportion to the property tax. 
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